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Abstract 
Using a panel of mainly unquoted UK firms over the period 2000-09, we document a 
significant effect of changes in the interest burden from debt-servicing on firm survival. 
The effect is found to be stronger during the recent financial crisis compared with more 
tranquil periods. Furthermore, the survival chances of bank-dependent, younger, and non-
exporting firms are most affected by changes in the interest burden, especially during the 
crisis. Our results are robust to using different estimation methods and different interest 
burden measures. They suggest that one way for policymakers to mitigate the effects of 
financial crises by limiting firm failures would be to prevent financing costs from rising, 
especially for those firms more likely to face liquidity constraints. 
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I. Introduction 
In August 2007, an irregular pattern of financial difficulties became a fully-fledged 
financial crisis involving most of the world’s largest banks (see Goodhart, 2008, for a 
survey). These events had a strong impact on UK financial markets in general and the 
banking sector in particular. Due to the turmoil in financial markets, at the end of the third 
quarter of 2008, 1.4 million small firms in the UK reported a severe shortage of credit, and 
some 30% of firms considered shutting down their operations altogether unless credit 
became cheaper and more easily available (Kirkup and Tyler, 2008)
1
. In addition, 
according to the Federation of Small Businesses, almost 30,000 small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) failed in 2009, while figures provided by the Office for National 
Statistics (2010) show that the corporate death rate in the UK at the end of 2009 was 
11.8%. Paying special attention to England and Wales during the early 1990s recession and 
the current financial crisis, Benito et al. (2010) confirm that company liquidations rise 
during recessionary periods. This evidence suggests the presence of a strong link between 
the shortage and high cost of credit, which typically characterizes recessions, and firm 
failures. 
The purpose of this paper is to further investigate the effects of the recent financial 
crisis on firms’ survival chances. To this end, we focus on the impact of changes in a firm-
specific interest rate (which we call interest burden and define as the ratio of a firm’s total 
interest payments to cash flow) on business failures in the UK over the period 2000-2009, 
and assess whether the strength of this impact increased during the crisis years.  
Our study is motivated by the financial accelerator-related hypothesis according to 
which deteriorations in economic conditions increase the cost of finance, which in turn 
                                                            
1
 Similarly, according to the British Chambers of Commerce (BCC), one third of small and medium-sized 
businesses in the UK faced difficulties in accessing finance during the recent crisis. Even more recently, 
access to finance remains a “major barrier” to growth for more than one in five small companies, with 41% 
of loan applications refused in the three months to February 2012 (Kuchler, 2012). 
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weakens firms’ balance sheet positions, thus influencing their ability to borrow, and, 
consequently, their activities and survival chances (Bernanke et al., 1996; Perez-Quiros 
and Timmermann, 2000; Vermeulen, 2002). It is well accepted that firms’ interest burden 
is inversely related to their balance sheet positions. A high interest burden can in fact be 
seen as evidence that the firm is charged a high external finance premium. The 
countercyclical movement in the premium for external funds amplifies borrowers’ 
spending and economic activity through the financial accelerator (Bernanke et al., 1996). 
Thus, the debt servicing cost is expected to affect firms’ real and financial decisions, as 
well as their survival prospects.  
The present study makes two important contributions to the literature. First, while 
previous papers have included balance sheet variables in equations modeling firm survival 
(Bunn and Redwood, 2003; Bridges and Guariglia, 2008), the literature is silent on the role 
of the firm-specific interest burden in determining firms’ chances of failure. Considering 
the evidence according to which higher levels of interest payments negatively affect fixed 
investment and employment decisions at the firm-level (Nickell and Nicolitsas, 1999; 
Benito, 2005; and Benito and Young, 2007), we move this literature forward by 
investigating, for the first time, the links between firms’ interest burden and their survival 
chances. As firms’ real activities are adversely affected by a rise in borrowing costs, we 
expect higher levels of the interest burden to be associated with lower chances of firm 
survival. Moreover, we differentiate the effects of changes in the interest burden on firm 
survival over a tranquil period (2000-2006) and the financial crisis period (2007-2009), 
focusing on the UK, which was particularly affected by the crisis (Rose and Spiegel, 
2011). This may help us understand the channels through which the financial crisis led to 
the failure of several UK firms, and in particular several small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs).  
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Our second contribution is that contrary to most of the literature, which looked at 
the effects of the financial crisis focusing on listed companies (e.g. Kahle and Stultz, 2013; 
Santos, 2013), we focus on a large panel of mainly unlisted firms. As unlisted companies 
are typically younger and smaller than their listed counterparts, they are more likely to face 
problems of asymmetric information, and are hence more likely to be affected by liquidity 
constraints (Hughes, 1994). Focusing on unlisted companies allows us therefore to provide 
a sharper analysis of the effects of the recent financial crisis on corporate behavior than 
previously done in the literature.  
In addition, the size of our panel enables us to take into account three dimensions of 
firm heterogeneity (bank dependency, age, and export status), aimed at measuring the 
degree of financing constraints faced by firms. This is an important contribution in the 
light of the fact that the firms in our sample are heterogeneous and unlikely to be affected 
by changes in the interest burden in the same way. Our first dimension of firm 
heterogeneity is based on the extent to which firms can be considered as bank-dependent. 
It is now well documented that since the onset of the crisis, banks have incurred severe 
losses, which have led them to significantly increase the cost of loans directed towards 
bank-dependent firms (Santos, 2013). Also considering that the pool of funds that banks 
could lend was reduced during the crisis (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010), this suggests 
that bank-dependent firms are likely to have suffered more from the effects of the crisis 
than their less bank-dependent counterparts. Next, we differentiate old from young firms, 
whereby the latter are likely to face a higher degree of information asymmetries due to the 
lack of track record reputation, and hence a higher degree of financing constraints 
(Hadlock and Pierce, 2010). Finally, we distinguish exporters from non-exporters, whereby 
the former are less likely to face financing constraints (Greenaway et al., 2007). We expect 
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bank-dependent, younger, and non-exporting firms’ failure probabilities to be most 
affected by changes in the interest burden, especially during the crisis years. 
We find that the interest burden has a significant effect on firm survival, and that 
this effect is stronger during the recent financial crisis compared with more tranquil 
periods. Furthermore, the survival chances of bank-dependent, younger, and non-exporting 
firms are most affected by changes in the interest burden, especially during the crisis. Our 
results are robust to using different estimation methods and different interest burden 
measures.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides some 
economic background for our research. In section III, we illustrate our empirical 
specifications and the main hypotheses that we test. Section IV describes our data and 
presents some summary statistics. Section V illustrates our main empirical results. Section 
VI provides some robustness tests, and Section VII concludes and discusses some policy 
implications. 
 
II. Economic background 
In a world characterized by asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders, there 
exists a wedge between the cost of funds generated externally (by issuing debt or equity) 
and internally (by retained earnings, Bernanke and Gertler, 1995; Bernanke et al., 1996). 
As general interest rates (and hence the interest burden) rise, firms’ net worth is reduced
2
, 
and their balance sheet situation worsens. Due to moral hazard and adverse selection 
problems, this reduces lending to firms through the balance sheet channel (Bernanke and 
Gertler, 1995). This happens because banks reduce their actual lending to firms and/or 
because they charge rates so high that the borrowers can no longer afford to take up the 
                                                            
2
 Net worth comprises the firm’s liquid assets and marketable securities. This includes cash flow. A rise in 
interest rates lowers cash flow, which, in turn, leads to a lower net worth. 
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loans. The upshot is that due to this reduced access to external finance, firms’ investment 
and other corporate activities decline, which in the extreme, may lead to a rising 
probability of bankruptcy (Nickell and Nicolitsas, 1999). Small and young firms, and more 
in general, firms more likely to suffer from asymmetric information problems and 
financing constraints, will be most affected by this channel, as banks are always more 
reluctant to lend to them, and because they typically suffer from a higher wedge between 
the cost of external and internal funds.  
This problem is likely to be exacerbated during periods of recession, which are 
characterized by sustained increases in the cost of external finance, independent on any 
monetary policy shift, through the financial accelerator (Bernanke et al., 1996). As the 
quality of borrowers deteriorates, which is typical during recessionary periods, lenders 
require in fact a higher spread to compensate them for the increased risk of lending (Santos 
and Winton, 2008). Being typically more risky, financially constrained firms are most 
likely to be charged even higher interest rates. This negatively affects their net worth, and 
provokes, in turn, a further reduction in their ability to borrow, further reducing their 
spending, investment, and production, raising their probability of bankruptcy, and 
magnifying the effects of the recession. Perez-Quiros and Timmermann (2000) propose a 
similar argument and further claim that because small firms, which are typically 
considered as financially constrained, are likely to be bank-dependent, they are also likely 
to be affected by the fact that under tighter credit conditions, the pool of funds that banks 
can lend out is reduced.  
The international evidence on the recent financial crisis is indicative of a rise in the 
cost of credit and of a drop in firms’ access to external finance. For instance, recent 
evidence shows that banks, and especially those which incurred the largest losses in 
connection with the subprime meltdown, monitored their borrowers more closely, 
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increased the cost of loans directed towards firms, and, more in general, became more 
cautious in their lending practices (Santos, 2013). Bank-dependent borrowers suffered 
more from this problem than borrowers with access to bond markets (Santos, 2013). Along 
similar lines, Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) document a strong reduction in the supply of 
bank credit during the financial crisis, and Almeida et al. (2013) also note a significant 
drop in firms’ access to external financing during the crisis, and claim this was a major 
determinant of firms’ survival.  
Focusing on the UK, the Bank of England reports a reduction of loans to private 
non-financial corporations (PNFCs) from UK monetary financial institutions during the 
financial crisis. Specifically, loans to PNFCs fell by £3.6 bn from 2007 to 2008, and by 
another £3.9 bn in 2009
3
. In addition, Bell and Young (2010) argue that the cost of credit 
rose sharply during the financial crisis, especially for SMEs. Yet, to the best of our 
knowledge, the extent to which this increase in the cost of credit has affected firms’ 
survival chances in the UK context has not been investigated. Our paper fills this gap in the 
literature. 
 
III. Empirical implementation 
Baseline specification 
In order to establish the extent to which financial pressure from debt-servicing costs affects 
firms’ survival prospects, we model the determinants of firm survival and check whether 
the interest burden significantly affects it. In line with Bunn and Redwood (2003), Bridges 
and Guariglia (2008), and Helmers and Rogers (2010, 2011), we define a firm as failed in a 
given year when its status is that of receivership, liquidation, or dissolved.  
                                                            
3 See the Bank of England Statistical Interactive Database (www.bankofengland.co.uk/mfsd/iadb). 
Page 7 of 64 Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
8 
 
Following recent literature on firm survival (Bandick and Görg and, 2010; Tsoukas, 
2011; and Görg and Spaliara, 2014), our empirical models are estimated using the 
complementary log-log (cloglog) model, which is equivalent to the discrete time version of 
the Cox proportional hazard model
4
. The baseline proportional hazard is formulated as: 
            ( , ) 1 exp[ exp( )]jh j X Xβ γ′= − − +   (1)         
where h( j, X) is the interval hazard for the period between the beginning and the end of the 
thj year after the first appearance of the firm. The β  parameters show the effects of the 
explanatory variables X on the hazard rate, and γ  captures period-specific effects on the 
hazard. To test whether firm exit is affected by the firm-specific interest rate, we include 
the interest burden (IB) among the explanatory variables. 
       The effects of changes in firm-specific interest payments on various aspects of firm 
behavior have been analyzed in previous literature. For instance, focusing on the UK, 
Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999) find that, controlling for expected wages and demand, an 
increase in the borrowing ratio (which they define as the ratio of interest payments to cash 
flow) has a large negative effect on firm-level employment. Benito (2005) shows that the 
same borrowing ratio is negatively related to firm-level inventory investment in both the 
UK and Spain; and Benito and Young (2007), that it also affects fixed investment, new 
equity issues, and dividend payments. Mojon et al. (2002) show that the mean interest on 
financial debt paid by small firms in the Euro area is on average higher than that paid by 
larger firms, and strongly affects firms’ fixed investment. Benito and Whitley (2003) 
provide evidence of a significant inverse relationship between the financial health of UK 
firms and the firm-specific implicit interest rate, which they define as the ratio of interest 
payments to the moving average of three years of total debt centred at the current year. 
                                                            
4
 Our results were robust to using a pooled and random-effects probit model, as well as a linear probability 
model. The results, which are available upon request, remained largely unchanged.  
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Finally, recent evidence by Spaliara (2009) shows that the capital-labor ratio of financially 
constrained UK firms is more sensitive to the interest burden compared to that of their 
unconstrained counterparts.  
         Moving this literature forward, we employ the interest burden to capture, for the first 
time, the effects of a change in debt-servicing costs on firm survival. In the spirit of Nickell 
and Nicolitsas (1999), Benito (2005), and Benito and Young (2007), we measure the 
interest burden using the ratio of interest payments to cash flow. Increases in interest 
payments should negatively affect firms’ financial position, therefore raising the interest 
burden. In turn, we expect higher levels of the interest burden to be associated with lower 
chances of firm survival.   
In addition to the interest burden, the vector X comprises three additional financial 
variables aimed at capturing the effects of financial health on the likelihood of survival. 
These include solvency (SOLV), measured as the ratio of shareholders’ funds to total 
assets; the leverage ratio (LEV), defined as the ratio of the firm’s current liabilities to total 
assets; and the profitability ratio (PROF), defined as the ratio of earnings before interest 
and taxes to total assets
5
. The vecor X also includes the following additional firm-specific 
characteristics, which, according to the literature, affect firm survival: size (SIZE), 
measured as the logarithm of total real assets; age (AGE), defined as the difference 
between the present year and the firm’s date of incorporation; and the dummy variable 
GROUP, which takes value one if the firm is part of a group, and zero otherwise. We also 
control for macroeconomic conditions by including the real effective exchange rate 
(EXCHANGE), calculated as the geometric weighted average of bilateral effective 
                                                            
5
 Contemporaneous values of the interest burden and our financial variables are included in our firm survival 
equation. Our results were robust to lagging these variables once to mitigate potential endogeneity concerns. 
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exchange rates adjusted by relative consumer prices. Lastly, X contains a set of industry 
and time dummies that control respectively for industry and business cycle effects
6
.
  
 
Accounting for differences between crisis and non-crisis periods 
In order to investigate the extent to which, controlling for other factors, firm survival 
differs in crisis years compared to more tranquil periods, we include in vector X of 
Equation (1) a financial crisis dummy (CRISIS), which takes value one over the period 
2007-09, and zero otherwise
7
. The coefficient associated with the CRISIS dummy is aimed 
at capturing the marginal effect of the crisis on firm survival, holding everything else 
equal.  
We next investigate whether in addition to having a direct effect on firms’ chances 
of survival, the financial crisis may also have an indirect impact by magnifying the effect 
of firms’ interest burden on survival. To this end, we examine whether the sensitivity of 
firms’ survival prospects to changes in the interest burden differs between crisis and 
tranquil periods. Specifically, we include in the vector X of Equation (1) an interaction 
between the interest burden (IB) and the CRISIS dummy, and an interaction between the 
interest burden (IB) and the (1-CRISIS) dummy. Comparing the coefficients on these two 
interaction terms enables us to assess the extent to which changes in the interest burden 
have a different effect on firms’ survival during tranquil and crisis periods. This test is 
motivated by the financial accelerator-related hypothesis according to which a 
deterioration of economic conditions negatively affects the health of firms’ balance sheets. 
In these circumstances, firms facing increased debt-servicing costs might face a higher 
                                                            
6
 Section 1 in the online Appendix provides a thorough discussion of the effects that each of these variables is 
likely to have on firms’ survival chances, in the light of the literature. 
7 Our results were robust to defining the dummy CRISIS equal to one in 2008-09, and 0 otherwise.  
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probability of failure during the crisis than outside. We therefore expect the effects of 
changes in the interest burden on firms’ chances of failure to be stronger during the crisis. 
 
Accounting for firm heterogeneity 
We next explore the extent to which an increase in the interest burden may have a different 
impact on the survival chances of firms characterized by different degrees of financing 
constraints, taking into account the effect of the financial crisis. This test is motivated by 
Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999), who analyze the effects of changes in firms’ borrowing ratio 
on their employment decisions, differentiating firms on the basis of the degree of financial 
pressure they face
8
.  
Following the literature (Kashyap et al., 1993; Huang, 2003; Guariglia and Mateut, 
2006), we use bank dependency as our first indicator of the degree of financing constraints 
faced by firms. This can be justified in the light of the fact that it is generally risky and low 
credit firms, which rely on bank finance (Huang, 2003).  As in Guariglia and Mateut 
(2006), we define bank-dependent firms in two ways: the first is based on their ratio of 
short–term debt to the sum of short-term debt and trade credit (mix1), and the second on 
their ratio of short-term debt to total current liabilities (mix2). Specifically, we create a 
dummy variable BankDep1 (BankDep2) which is equal to one for firm i in year t if firm i’s  
mix1 (mix2) falls in the top 50% of  the distribution of the mix1s (mix2s) of all firms 
operating in the same industry as firm i in year t, and zero otherwise.  As short-term debt is 
                                                            
8
 Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999) identify stronger effects of shifts in the borrowing ratio for companies which 
are under greater long-term financial pressure. They proxy long-term financial pressure using firm size, the 
dividend payout ratio, and the debt to capital ratio. 
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predominately made up of bank finance, the BankDep1 and BankDep2 dummies are good 
proxies of bank dependency.  
We next partition our sample into young and old firms using the age of 
incorporation as a sorting device. We define a firm as young (old) in a given year if its age 
falls in the bottom (top) 50% of the age distribution of all firms operating in the same 
industry as this firm in that year, and 0 otherwise. Spaliara (2009) and Hadlock and Pierce 
(2010)  note that young firms are less known and have not established a track record in the 
market. Consequently, they are more likely to be associated with a higher degree of 
informational asymmetry, and are less likely to have access to capital markets.  
Finally, we differentiate firms between exporters and non-exporters, whereby the 
latter are firms that never exported throughout the sample period. It has been found that 
exporters are generally financially healthier than non-exporters (Greenaway et al., 2007; 
Guariglia and Mateut, 2010). This could be explained by three important considerations. 
First, exporters have access to both domestic and international financial markets, which 
enables them to diversify their sources of financing and the associated risks. Second, they 
are less tied to the domestic cycle, and less subject to those financial constraints induced by 
tight monetary policy and recessions at home.
9
 They therefore benefit from a more stable 
cash flow, which, providing greater assurance to lenders that the firm will be able to 
service its obligation, relaxes their liquidity constraints (Guariglia and Mateut, 2010). 
Finally, given the presence of sunk costs that need to be met when entering foreign markets 
for the first time (Roberts and Tybout, 1997), being an exporter also provides a signal that 
the firm is sufficiently productive to generate enough profits in foreign markets to recover 
                                                            
9
 This argument relies on the assumption that business cycles are not perfectly coordinated across countries. 
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the sunk costs. This increases the likelihood that the firm will be able to service its external 
debt, and further relaxes the liquidity constraints that it faces. 
To take firm heterogeneity into account, we estimate the following specification: 
1 2
3 4 5
7 8 9 10 11
0
6
12
* * * *(1 )
*(1 )* *(1 )
( , ) 1
*(1 )
[ (
)]j
IB CONS CRISIS IB CONS CRISIS
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h j X exp exp
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β β β
β β β
β β β β β β γ
β
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+ −
− + − − +
+ +
+
+ +
(2) 
where CONS is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is (in turn) bank-dependent, young, 
or a non-exporter, and 0 otherwise. We expect the effect of a rise in the cost of finance on 
the survival of both constrained and unconstrained firms to be stronger during the financial 
crisis, as financial intermediaries became reluctant to lend money to these firms (Parker 
and Eaglesham, 2008; Bank of England, 2009; Fraser, 2009) and/or charged them higher 
interest rates (Bell and Young, 2010; Santos, 2013), further jeopardizing their survival 
chances (i.e. we expect to observe that β1> β2 and that β3>β4). Moreover, we expect an 
increase in IB to have a more severe impact on the survival of more bank-dependent firms 
compared to their less bank-dependent counterparts. The same is true for young versus old 
firms, as well as non-exporters versus exporters (i.e. we expect to observe that β1> β3 and 
that β2>β4).  
 
IV. Data and summary statistics 
Data 
Our data set is drawn from the annual accounting reports taken from the Financial Analysis 
Made Easy (FAME) database, published by Bureau Van Dijk Electronic Publishing 
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(BvDEP). The full version of the FAME database provides information on 2.8 million 
companies (1.9 million of which are in a detailed format) over the period 2000–2009
10
.  
To construct our data set, we use three different versions of FAME. In particular, 
we employ FAME October 2010, FAME October 2008, and FAME February 2005. In line 
with Helmers et al. (2011) and Javorcik and Li (2013), we take this approach to address 
potential attrition bias since FAME keeps only firms that have not been inactive for more 
than four years. Therefore, if only the 2010 version of FAME were used, we would miss 
firms that exited by 2006 or possibly 2005. Thus, our dataset is able to track firm exits up 
to the earlier part of the sample period.  
To accurately construct our dependent variable we also take into account that some 
firms may exit due to mergers and acquisitions. Following Helmers and Rogers (2010) and 
Görg and Spaliara (2014), we use Bureau Van Dijk’s ZEPHYR database, which contains 
information on mergers and acquisitions, to identify and drop those firms that are 
mistakenly coded as “failed” in our data. This ensures that our indicator variable has been 
accurately constructed to capture firms that failed and did not exit due to mergers and 
acquisitions.  
Following normal selection criteria used in the literature, we drop observations with 
negative sales, as well as observations with negative total assets. Firms that do not have 
complete records on our main regression variables are also dropped. To control for the 
potential influence of outliers, we exclude observations in the 1% tails for each of our 
regression variables. Our final panel, which is unbalanced, includes 20,238 firms and 
                                                            
10
 It is noteworthy that three types of access to the FAME database are available. Type C gives access to all 
firms in the database, while types B and A exclude in turn subsets of the smallest companies. Our dataset is 
based on type A access. In addition, a maximum of ten years of complete data history can be downloaded at 
once. We have only selected firms that have unconsolidated accounts: this ensures that the majority of the 
firms in our dataset are relatively small. Moreover, it avoids the double counting of firms belonging to 
groups, which would be included in the dataset if firms with consolidated accounts were also part of it. 
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136,982 observations
11
. This represents approximately 20% of the UK manufacturing 
sector excluding sole proprietorships and partnerships with self-employed owner-
manager(s)
12
. The vast majority of firms included in this dataset are not traded on the stock 
market. This is an appealing characteristic since unquoted firms are more likely to be 
associated with a higher degree of information asymmetry and therefore more likely to 
face an increased probability of failure, especially during extreme economic conditions 
(Hughes, 1994)
13
.  
 
Summary statistics 
Tables 1 presents descriptive statistics of all variables used in our empirical models for the 
entire sample. We distinguish between failed and surviving firms (columns 2 and 3); and 
crisis and tranquil periods (columns 5 and 6). In columns 4 and 7 we report p-values of a 
test for the equality of means. We can see that the average failure rate in our sample is 
14.3%, which is much higher compared with previous UK studies (Bunn and Redwood, 
2003 and Bridges and Guariglia, 2008). The difference between our figures and theirs is 
probably due to the fact that their sample covers a much earlier time period (up to 2003). It 
is therefore possible that failure rates have increased over the most recent years. Our 
figures are consistent with the Structural Business Statistics reported by Eurostat, 
according to which the average failure rate between 2000 and 2009 in the manufacturing 
sector is approximately 10%. When comparing failing and surviving firms (columns 2 and 
3), we note that the former are charged a significantly higher interest for servicing short-
term debt. Moreover, surviving firms are less indebted, more profitable, and less solvent 
                                                            
11 See Section 2 of the online Appendix for information about the structure of our panel (Table A1) and for 
precise definitions of all the variables used. Also see Sections 3 and 4 of the online Appendix for a discussion 
on the representativeness of our sample and on whether our sample selection criteria generate bias. 
12
 The data are taken from the Department of Business and Innovations Skills, Small and Medium-sized 
Enterprise Statistics for the UK and Regions (http://stats.bis.gov.uk/ed/sme). 
13
 Also see Bunn and Redwood (2003), Bridges and Guariglia (2008), Helmers and Rogers (2010, 2011), and 
Görg and Spaliara (2014), who used the FAME dataset to study business failures in the UK.   
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than their failed counterparts. These findings are in line with Bunn and Redwood (2003), 
Bridges and Guariglia, (2008), and Görg and Spaliara (2014). Furthermore, survivors are 
larger, older, and more likely to be part of a group. These differences between sub-samples 
are statistically significant in all cases (column 4). 
When comparing the 2007-09 financial crisis period with the earlier years of our 
sample (columns 5 and 6), we observe that the average failure rate is higher during the 
crisis. Yet, although the difference in failure rates during and outside the crisis is 
statistically significant at the 1% level (column 7), it is actually not very large. Three 
factors can explain the relatively low number of insolvencies over the crisis period. First, 
the relatively healthy position of the corporate sector prior to the crisis may have played a 
role. Second, the forbearance by banks on existing loans, together with the low level of the 
Bank Rate may have enabled businesses to continue trading despite the lower demand and 
related losses. Third, the relatively few company liquidations may be explained by effects 
of monetary and fiscal policies implemented during the financial crisis period (see Benito 
el al., 2010, and Bank of England, 2012). It should be noted, however, that the overall low 
number of UK insolvencies during the 2007-2009 period hides the fact that survival was a 
major problem for UK SMEs. 
 Moving to the interest burden, we note that this variable takes the value of 37.5% 
during the crisis, while it equals 35.8% during tranquil periods. Once again, this difference 
is statistically significant. It is also noteworthy that the average interest burden in our 
sample is higher than that reported by Benito (2005) and Benito and Young (2007). This 
can be explained considering that, contrary to ours, their study focuses on UK listed 
companies, which are likely to be less indebted than their unlisted counterparts. This 
higher interest burden during the crisis is driven by an increase in interest payments, rather 
than by a decline in cash flow. Specifically, according to our data, average interest 
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payments increased by 72% during the crisis period. The difference in the mean interest 
payment figures across the crisis and preceding periods is statistically significant at the 1% 
level. On the other hand, average cash flow actually increased by 5% in the crisis period, 
and the difference in mean cash flow during and before the crisis is only marginally 
significant
14
. This confirms that during the financial crisis, firms faced an increase in the 
debt-servicing cost. Specifically, the higher interest burden observed in the period 2007-
2009 is mainly due to the increase in the spread over the reference rate at which loans were 
offered. As explained in Bank of England (2009), “increases in spreads are likely to reflect 
in part a re-pricing due to increased perceptions of credit risk, following a prolonged 
period earlier in the decade where corporate credit risks were underpriced” (pp. 6-7).
15
  
In summary, these preliminary statistics suggest that firms’ failure rates may be 
related to the interest burden, financial health, and the recent financial crisis. In the 
sections that follow, we provide a formal econometric analysis on the links between these 
variables
16
.  
 
V. Empirical results 
Firm survival, financial crisis, and the role of interest burden 
In this section we shed light on the role played by changes in the interest burden on firms’ 
survival before and during the recent financial crisis. A few papers have considered the 
impact of financial pressure on firms’ real decisions (Nickell and Nicolitsas, 1999; Benito, 
2005; and Benito and Young, 2007). In particular, they have documented significant 
effects of debt-servicing costs on investment expenditures, dividend payments, inventory 
investment, and employment. Given that debt-servicing costs increased during the recent 
                                                            
14
 These numbers are not reported in the Table for brevity. 
15
 A similar point with reference to UK loan spreads is also made by Bell and Young (2010). Also see Fraser 
(2009) for an illustration of the extent to which the cost of loans to SMEs increased during the recent 
financial crisis.  
16
 Additional summary statistics are reported in Section 5 of the online Appendix. 
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crisis as evidenced by Bell and Young (2010), we take one step further and evaluate the 
effects of changes in the interest burden on firm survival, and assess whether these effects 
were magnified during the financial crisis. Table 2 presents the estimates of our survival 
equations. In column 1, the interest burden is included in the estimating equation along 
with a number of firm-specific and other control variables. The coefficient associated with 
the interest burden enables us to assess the consequences of a ceteris paribus increase in 
interest burden on the probability of firm exit. Column 2 includes both the interest burden 
and the crisis dummy, and column 3 includes the crisis dummy, as well as the indirect 
effect of the crisis through interactions with the interest burden.  
Starting with column 1, we observe that the firm-specific interest burden exerts a 
positive and highly significant effect on firm failure. Considering that the predicted exit 
probability evaluated at the mean of the independent variables is 3.5 %, the coefficient on 
IB suggests that a one percent increase in the interest burden is associated with a rise in the 
predicted exit probability of around [exp(0.614)-1]*3.5= 2.96 percentage points. 
Consistent with our expectations, increases in the debt-servicing costs affect firms’ 
survival prospects negatively. This is in line with other studies which find a negative effect 
of debt-servicing costs on investment expenditures, dividend payments, inventory 
investment, and employment (Nickell and Nicolitsas, 1999; Benito, 2005, and Benito and 
Young, 2007)
17,18
. 
Column 2 includes the crisis dummy and is aimed at evaluating the marginal effect 
of the crisis on firm survival, holding everything else equal. The crisis dummy attracts a 
                                                            
17
 Even though our equation controls for a range of variables that typically affect corporate death rates, one 
could argue that a higher interest burden and firm exit may be driven by the same unobservable variables and 
therefore may seem to occur at the same time, without a causal link running from the former to the latter. In 
order to convince readers that this is not the case, we show that our results are robust to lagging the interest 
burden, using Instrumental Variable (IV) pooled linear and probit models, a simple fixed-effects model, a 
conditional Logit fixed-effects model, an IV fixed-effects model, and a two stage least squares model 
estimated in first-differences. The results of these approaches are reported and discussed in Section 7 of the 
online Appendix.   
18
 Other coefficients in the Table are discussed in Section 6 of the online Appendix. 
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positive coefficient, which can be explained considering that during downturns, economic 
activity faces a general slowdown which is likely to affect firm survival. The coefficients 
on the interest burden, control, and financial variables are similar to those reported in 
column 1.  
When we include the interactions between the interest burden and the crisis/non-
crisis dummies in column 3, we find a positive and highly significant effect of the firm-
specific interest rate on the likelihood of exit both in and out of the crisis. However, the 
results suggest that firms respond differently to the financial pressure of servicing debt 
throughout the cycle: increases in interest payments have a greater impact on the hazard of 
failure during the crisis than outside. The difference in this effect across the two time 
periods is economically important: a one percent increase in the interest burden raises in 
fact the predicted exit probability by 9.68% over the period 2007-2009, but only by 2.18% 
during tranquil periods. The p-value for the equality of the coefficients indicates a 
statistically significant difference between the two coefficients. It is also interesting to 
notice that once the interaction terms are added to the equation, the CRISIS dummy loses 
its significance. This suggests that the crisis affected firm survival mainly indirectly, by 
magnifying the effect of changes in the interest burden. This can be explained in the light 
of the financial accelerator hypothesis, according to which the effects of changes in firms’ 
balance sheet positions on their activities, and hence their survival, are magnified during 
recessionary periods (Bernanke et al., 1996; Perez-Quiros and Timmermann, 2000). 
Another explanation for our findings could be that, during the crisis, banks became less 
tolerant of companies facing a high interest burden, which may reflect a change in their 
risk appetite. In other words, because they were concerned about their own balance sheets 
due to the increased risk of non-performing loans and write-offs, banks monitored their 
borrowers more closely and became generally more cautious in their lending practices 
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(Kara et al., 2011). In line with this argument, Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010), Bell and 
Young (2010), and Almeida et al. (2013) note a significant reduction in the supply of bank 
credit in both the US and the UK during the crisis. 
 In a nutshell, our results so far suggest that higher levels of the interest burden are 
likely to have increased firms’ chances of failure during the recent financial crisis. To 
provide further support to this conclusion, we have partitioned our sample into firm-years 
that experienced a rise in their interest burden, and firm-years whose interest burden either 
stayed constant or declined. Focusing on the entire sample, the former experienced an 
average failure rate of 16.11%, while the average failure rate of the latter was only 5.27%. 
The difference between the two rates is statistically significant at the 1% level. This 
confirms that an increasing interest burden is generally associated with a higher failure 
rate. In addition, as shown in Figure A12 in Section 8 of the online Appendix, only those 
firm-years that experienced a rise in the interest burden show a significant rise in their 
failure rates over the crisis period. Other observations actually show a declining failure 
rate
19
. This confirms that rising interest payments are likely to have been one of the driving 
factors explaining the high exit of firms during the recent financial crisis. 
 
Differentiating firms according to their degree of bank dependency, age, and 
exporting activity 
In Table 3, we investigate whether changes in interest payment obligations have a 
differential impact on the hazard of failure of firms more and less likely to face financing 
constraints, in and out of the crisis. We expect more bank-dependent firms to face a higher 
sensitivity of failure to changes in the interest burden. The same argument holds for young 
                                                            
19
 In unreported statistics, we show that it is mainly bank-dependent firms and non-exporters who suffered a 
significant increase in the interest burden over the crisis period. 
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and non-exporting firms, which are typically more financially constrained than their older 
and exporting counterparts.  
We label bank-dependent (columns 1 and 2), young (column 3), and non-exporting 
firms (column 4) as “constrained”. The interest burden is interacted with both the 
constrained/unconstrained dummies and the crisis/non-crisis dummies to gauge the extent 
to which the effects of debt-servicing cost on the likelihood of failure differ for more and 
less-financially constrained firms throughout the business cycle. The emphasis is put on 
the differential behavior of firms more likely to face financial constraints during and 
outside the crisis, but we also check for differences in the behavior of unconstrained firms 
over the two periods. To ensure that our results are robust, we carry out our estimations 
using two different classification criteria for bank dependency, based on firms’ short-term 
debt to the sum of short-term debt and trade credit (BankDep1, column 1) and
 
short-term 
debt to total current liabilities (BankDep2, column 2).  
Focusing on rows 1 and 2 of Table 3, we observe that for bank-dependent, young, 
and non-exporting firms, the interest burden exhibits a much larger coefficient during the 
crisis than outside. A test for the equality of the coefficients is reported at the foot of the 
Table. It shows that the differences in the coefficients on the interest burden for 
constrained firms during and outside the crisis are statistically significant. 
 
We next compare rows 3 and 4 and observe that the estimated coefficients on the 
interest burden are positive and significant for unconstrained firms both in and out of the 
crisis, and, once again, generally higher in the crisis. The p-values for the test of the 
differences in these coefficients show that they are once again statistically significant.    
Next, we compare the coefficients on the interest burden at constrained and 
unconstrained firms during the crisis (rows 1 and 3). We observe that the sensitivity of the 
firms’ chances of survival to changes in the interest burden is always higher for the former. 
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The p-values reported at the foot of the Table reveal that in two out of four cases, during 
the crisis, the coefficients on the interest burden for constrained firms are significantly 
different from those of unconstrained firms
20
.   
             Access to capital markets is likely to be prohibitively expensive for financially 
constrained firms, which are more likely to depend on banks for external finance. During 
the financial crisis, the strong reliance of these firms on bank debt had disastrous effects on 
their viability given the shortage of bank credit available in the market. It is in fact 
documented that during the crisis, most banks tightened lending standards. As a 
consequence of this, those bank-dependent financially constrained firms had to scale back 
their investment projects and restrain their activities. Consequently, it is not surprising that 
following a rise in their debt obligations, more-bank-dependent, young and non-exporting 
firms were more likely to fail during the crisis.   
The last pair of interactions to be compared are those in rows 2 and 4. Results for 
both constrained and unconstrained firms during tranquil periods are mixed. When bank 
dependency is used as a measure of constraints, the effect of changes in the interest burden 
on firm chances of survival is higher for more bank-dependent firms. Yet, when age and 
exporting are employed as sorting devices, the effect is higher for older and equal for 
exporting firms. In these cases, however, the differences in the relevant coefficients are not 
statistically significant at conventional levels. 
In summary, the greater sensitivities of firm survival to changes in the interest 
burden documented for more-bank-dependent, young, and non-exporting firms during the 
                                                            
20
 This happens when we use the bank dependency criteria to differentiate firms into more and less likely to 
face financing constraints, and may be indicative of the importance of being bank-dependent during the 
crisis. 
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crisis than outside confirms that rising interest payments are likely to have been one of the 
driving factors explaining the high exit of financially constrained firms during the crisis
21
.  
 
VI. Conclusions 
The literature on business failures has mainly considered the effects of direct measures of 
firms’ balance sheet health on firms’ survival chances. In this paper we take a different 
angle by examining, for the first time, the role of firm-specific interest payments, measured 
by the interest burden, in determining firm survival. Our results, based on firm-level data 
for the UK over the period 2000 to 2009, suggest that there is a strong link between debt-
servicing costs and firm survival. This link is particularly strong during the 2007-09 
financial crisis, during which firms became more likely to fail as a consequence of an 
increase in their interest burden. When we differentiate firms into more and less likely to 
face financing constraints, we find that survival chances at bank-dependent, younger, and 
non-exporting firms are the most severely affected by changes in interest payments, 
especially during the crisis. Our results are robust to using different estimation methods 
and different interest burden measures. 
The increased cost of servicing debt which triggered the rise in the interest burden 
over the period 2007 to 2009 may have been a driving factor for many of the corporate 
failures which accompanied the crisis. This can be explained considering that banks 
became less tolerant of companies facing a high interest burden during the crisis, which 
may reflect a change in their risk appetite. In other words, because during economic 
slowdowns, banks face a higher risk of non-performing loans and write-offs, they tend to 
                                                            
21
 As our sample separation criteria (with the exception of age) may be endogenous, we tested whether our 
results were robust to using pre-sample bank dependency and export status to partition our sample. These 
results, which are not reported for brevity but available upon request, were very similar to those reported in 
Table 3. Our results were also robust to controlling for the possible endogeneity of our financial variables by 
using instrumental variables (IV) probit models, and to using an alternative measure of the interest burden, 
namely the ratio of interest payments to total debt. These robustness tests are discussed respectively in 
Sections 9 and 10 of the online Appendix. 
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monitor their borrowers more closely and are generally more cautious in their lending 
practices (Kara et al., 2011). The reduction in the supply of bank loans directed towards 
firms with a high interest burden is likely to have prevented these firms from investing, and 
ultimately to have hastened their exit from the market.  
The resulting policy implications are important, in particular, but not only, in the 
current economic climate. We suggest that policymakers should prevent financing costs 
from rising during economic downturns. This implication is reflected in the extraordinary 
measures the Bank of England has taken during the financial crisis period. Specifically, the 
fact that the Bank of England’s own policy rate was reduced to a historic low of 0.5% is 
likely to have significantly contributed to the lower corporate failure rates. In addition, 
several other policies aimed at making low cost credit readily available to financially 
constrained firms, such as the £190 billion Project Merlin, the National Loan  Guarantee 
Scheme, the Funding for Lending Scheme (FLS), and the Discount Window Facility 
(DWF) are also likely to have helped  stabilise the UK market and improve firms’ 
performance and survival prospects
22
.  
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TABLE 1: Summary statistics 
 Total 
Sample 
(1) 
Fail=1 
(2) 
Fail=0 
(3) 
Diff. 
(4) 
Crisis=1 
(5) 
Crisis=0 
(6) 
Diff. 
(7) 
Fail 0.143 1.00 0.000 - 0.148 0.141 0.002 
 (0.35) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.35) (0.34)  
IB 0.362 0.496 0.351 0.000 0.375 0.358 0.000 
 (0.38) (0.41) (0.38)  (0.39) (0.38)  
Leverage 0.475 0.577 0.471 0.000 0.440 0.489 0.000 
 (0.35) (0.58) (0.33)  (0.29) (0.37)  
Solvency 0.423 0.448 0.421 0.002 0.472 0.404 0.000 
 (0.53) (0.64) (0.53)  (0.35) (0.59)  
Profit 0.085 0.063 0.086 0.000 0.088 0.084 0.001 
 (0.19) (0.31) (0.18)  (0.17) (0.19)  
Size 3.917 3.531 3.939 0.000 4.026 3.875 0.000 
 (1.31) (1.21) (1.32)  (1.34) (1.30)  
Age 26.312 25.012 26.529 0.000 28.357 25.479 0.000 
 (22.39) (22.00) (22.44)  (22.65) (22.22)  
Group 0.192 0.069 0.212 0.000 0.213 0.183 0.000 
 (0.39) (0.25) (0.41)  (0.41) (0.38)  
Exchange 96.948 96.791 96.974 0.004 84.213 102.137 0.000 
 (15.51) (11.63) (11.49)  (9.20) (7.69)  
Observations 136,982 19,634 117,348  39,661 97,321  
 
Notes: The table presents sample means. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. Fail is a dummy that 
equals 1 in a given year if the firm is recorded as failed in that year, and 0 otherwise. Crisis is a dummy 
representing the recent financial crisis. It takes value 1 in the years 2007-2009, and 0 otherwise. IB is defined as 
the ratio of interest payments to cash flow. Leverage is measured as the firm's total current liabilities to assets ratio. 
Solvency is defined as the ratio of the firm’s shareholders’ funds over its total assets. Profit is the ratio of the firm's 
profits before interest and tax to its total assets. Size is given by the log of the firm’s real assets measured in 
thousands of UK sterling. Age is defined as the difference between the present year and the firm’s date of 
incorporation. Group is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is part of a group (UK or foreign), and 0 otherwise. 
Exchange is the real effective exchange rate. Diff. is the p-value of the test statistic for the equality of means. 
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Table 2: Firm survival and the financial crisis 
 
Notes: All estimates were obtained using a proportional hazard model. The dependent variable is a 
dummy equal to 1 if the firm fails, and 0 otherwise. Time and industry dummies were included in all 
models. Robust z-statistics are presented in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 
The F-test of equality for IB refers to the test of equality between IB*Crisis and IB*(1-Crisis). Also see 
notes to Table 1. *: significant at 10%; **: significant at 5%; ***: significant at 1%.  
 
  
Fail Baseline IB and Crisis IB*Crisis 
 (1) (2) (3) 
IB 0.614*** 0.614***  
 (8.77) (8.77)  
Crisis  0.910** 0.383 
  (2.15) (0.89) 
IB*Crisis   1.326*** 
   (8.10) 
IB*(1-Crisis)   0.484*** 
   (6.91) 
Solvency -0.420*** -0.420*** -0.378** 
 (-2.80) (-2.80) (-2.51) 
Leverage 0.496*** 0.496*** 0.517*** 
 (3.39) (3.39) (3.55) 
Profit 0.054 0.054 0.063 
 (0.48) (0.48) (0.59) 
Size -0.341*** -0.341*** -0.342*** 
 (-12.00) (-12.00) (-12.10) 
Age -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
 (-0.27) (-0.27) (-0.31) 
Group -0.583*** -0.583*** -0.581*** 
 (-5.22) (-5.22) (-5.20) 
Exchange 0.157*** 0.157*** 0.154*** 
 (5.59) (5.59) (5.46) 
Constant -16.012*** -16.922*** -16.539*** 
 (-6.94) (-6.23) (-6.09) 
F-test of equality 
(p-value)for 
   
IB   0.000 
Observations 58,955 58,955 58,955 
Log-Likelihood -8,403 -8,403 -8,384 
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TABLE 3: Firm survival, financing constraints, and the crisis 
 
 
Notes: All estimates were obtained using a proportional hazard model. The dependent variable is a dummy equal 
to one if the firm fails, and zero otherwise. Time and industry dummies were included in all models. Robust z-
statistics are presented in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Cons is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the firm is financially constrained, and 0 otherwise. It is based, in turn, on BankDep(1/2), Young, and 
Non-exporter. BankDep1(2) is equal to 1 in a given year for firm i if its mix1(2) is in the top 50% of the 
distribution of the mix1(2)s of all firms operating in the same industry as firm i in that year, and 0 otherwise. Mix1 
is the ratio of short-term debt to the sum of short-term debt and trade credit. Mix2 is the ratio of short-term debt to 
total current liabilities. Young is equal to 1 for firm i in year t if this firm’s age falls in the lower 50% of the age 
distribution of all firms operating in the same industry as firm i in that year, and 0 otherwise. Non-exporter is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has never reported a positive amount of exports throughout the sample 
period, and 0 otherwise. With reference to the F-test of equality, IB*Cons refers to the test of equality between 
IB*Cons*Crisis and IB*Cons*(1-Crisis). IB*(1-Cons) refers to the test of equality between IB*(1-Cons)*Crisis 
and IB*(1-Cons)*(1-Crisis). IB*Crisis refers to the test of equality between IB*Cons*Crisis and IB*(1-
Cons)*Crisis. Finally, IB*(1-Crisis) refers to the test of equality between IB*Cons*(1-Crisis) and IB*(1-Cons)*(1-
Crisis). Also see notes to Table 1.*: significant at 10%; **: significant at 5%; ***: significant at 1%.  
Fail Cons= 
f(BankDep1) 
Cons= 
f(BankDep2) 
Cons= 
f(Young) 
Cons= 
f (Non-
Exporter) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
IB*Cons* Crisis 1.667*** 1.583*** 1.325*** 1.349*** 
 (8.38) (7.93) (7.17) (7.48) 
IB*Cons*(1-Crisis) 0.702*** 0.676*** 0.458*** 0.484*** 
 (8.10) (7.87) (5.09) (6.23) 
IB*(1-Cons)* Crisis 1.037*** 1.145*** 1.322*** 1.298*** 
 (5.59) (6.33) (7.00) (6.88) 
IB*(1-Cons)*(1-Crisis) 0.238*** 0.346*** 0.509*** 0.484*** 
 (2.60) (3.97) (5.77) (5.22) 
Crisis 0.148 0.135 0.384 0.382 
 (0.34) (0.31) (0.89) (0.88) 
Solvency -0.460*** -0.389** -0.381** -0.379** 
 (-2.86) (-2.44) (-2.52) (-2.51) 
Leverage 0.688*** 0.615*** 0.517*** 0.517*** 
 (4.26) (3.86) (3.54) (3.54) 
Profit -0.027 -0.007 0.060 0.063 
 (-0.19) (-0.05) (0.55) (0.59) 
Size -0.323*** -0.324*** -0.342*** -0.341*** 
 (-10.98) (-11.14) (-12.07) (-11.95) 
Age -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-0.06) (-0.19) (-0.43) (-0.30) 
Group -0.569*** -0.584*** -0.581*** -0.581*** 
 (-4.88) (-5.14) (-5.19) (-5.20) 
Exchange 0.140*** 0.141*** 0.154*** 0.154*** 
 (4.91) (4.94) (5.46) (5.46) 
Constant -15.292*** -15.356*** -16.529*** -16.539*** 
 (-5.56) (-5.59) (-5.60) (-5.60) 
F-test of equality (p-value)     
IB*Cons 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
IB*(1-Cons) 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001 
IB*Crisis 
IB*(1-Crisis) 
0.000 
0.000 
0.011 
0.000 
0.986 
0.648 
0.762 
0.997 
Observations 53,292 54,989 58,955 58,955 
Log-Likelihood -7,554 -7,866 -8,383 -8,384 
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1. Description of the variables included in vector X in Equation (1)  
In addition to the interest burden, X comprises a vector of financial variables aimed at 
capturing the effect of financial health on the likelihood of survival. Specifically, following 
Clementi and Hopenheyn’s (2006) theoretical model, we control for three dimensions of the 
health of a firm’s balance sheet, namely solvency, leverage and profitability. We define 
solvency (SOLV) as the ratio of shareholders’ funds to total assets. This variable has been 
used in earlier studies as an indicator of firms’ liquidity (Mateut et al., 2006). We expect 
less liquid firms to be more likely to fail, as they have less internal finance at hand.  
As an additional balance sheet indicator, we consider the firm’s leverage ratio (LEV), 
which is defined as the ratio of the firm’s current liabilities to total assets, and measures the 
firm's overall indebtedness. Higher levels of existing debt are often associated with a poorer 
balance sheet, and thus firms with higher levels of debt face greater difficulties obtaining 
external finance, and are hence constrained in their investment and growth (Zingales, 1998; 
Görg and Spaliara, 2014). We therefore expect to observe a positive relationship between 
leverage and the probability of failure. 
The profitability ratio (PROF) is defined as the ratio of earnings before interest and 
taxes to total assets. Following Bunn and Redwood (2003), and Bridges and Guariglia 
(2008), we use this variable as a proxy for firm efficiency. We expect to observe a negative 
relationship between firms’ profitability and their probability of failure. 
The vector X also includes additional firm-specific characteristics. These control 
variables are chosen following previous work on firm survival. Firm size (SIZE) is measured 
as the logarithm of total real assets. According to Geroski (1995) and Clementi and 
Hopenhayn (2006), large firms are less at risk of failure than small firms. Large firms are in 
fact likely to have access to more sources of external finance than small firms, which are 
predominantly bank-dependent. Hence, when banks interrupt their lines of credit, which is 
likely to happen during extreme economic conditions, large firms experience higher survival 
probabilities than their smaller counterparts. We therefore expect to find a positive 
relationship between firm size and the probability of survival. We also include the firm’s 
age (AGE), defined as the difference between the present year and the firm’s date of 
incorporation. Firms with an established track record are less likely to fail than younger 
firms because they have acquired reputation in the market and therefore face a smaller 
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liquidation risk (Hadlock and Pierce, 2010). Consequently, we expect to observe a negative 
association between age and the incidence of failure. 
Furthermore, we account for whether a firm is part of a group (UK or foreign). 
Specifically, we construct the dummy variable GROUP, which takes the value one if a firm 
is part of a group, and zero otherwise. We expect to observe a negative relationship between 
this variable and the hazard of failure since group firms are likely to have better access to 
capital markets and to respond more quickly to shocks than single firms, due to better 
information processing (Disney et al., 2003; and Bridges and Guariglia, 2008).  
We also control for macroeconomic conditions by including the real effective exchange 
rate in our model
1
. In line with Baggs et al. (2009), who document a negative association 
between survival and appreciation of the Canadian dollar, we expect the exchange rate 
(EXCHANGE) to decrease the survival prospects of firms
2
. Lastly, the vector X contains a 
set of industry and time dummies that control respectively for industry and business cycle 
effects.   
 
2. More details about the dataset and the variables used 
 
Structure of the panel 
Table A1 shows the structure of our panel. 
 
Definitions of the variables used 
FAIL: dummy variable (DV) equal to 1 if the firm is recorded as failed in a given year, and 
0 otherwise. We define a firm as failed when its status is that of receivership, liquidation, or 
dissolved. 
IB: ratio of interest payments to cash flow (which is defined as profit and loss after taxes 
plus depreciation). 
IB2: ratio of interest payments to total debt. 
LEV: ratio of current liabilities to total assets.  
SOLV: ratio of shareholders’ funds to total assets. 
PROF: ratio of profits before interest and tax to total assets. 
                                                            
1
 Following the Bank for International Settlements’ methodology, we calculate the effective exchange rate as 
the geometric weighted average of bilateral exchange rates adjusted by relative consumer prices. 
2
 The intuition behind this prediction is the following: an appreciation of the domestic currency gives foreign 
firms a cost advantage, which intensifies the competition faced by domestic firms, forcing them to reduce the 
prices they charge up to a point at which they might be forced to exit the market (Baggs et al., 2009). 
Page 34 of 64Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
4 
 
SIZE: logarithm of real total assets. 
AGE: difference between the present year and the firm’s date of incorporation. 
GROUP: DV equal to 1 if the firm is part of a group (UK or foreign), and 0 otherwise.  
MIX1: ratio of short-term debt to the sum of short-term debt and trade credit.  
MIX2: ratio of short-term debt to total current liabilities. 
BANKDEP1(2): DV equal to 1 in a given year for a given firm i if its MIX1(2) is in the top 
50% of the distribution of the MIX1(2) of all firms operating in the same industry as firm i 
in that year, and 0 otherwise.   
YOUNG: DV equal to 1 for firm i in year t if this firm’s age falls in the lower 50% of the 
age distribution of all firms operating in the same industry as firm i in that year, and 0 
otherwise.  
NON-EXPORTER: DV equal to 1 if the firm has never reported a positive amount of 
exports (which are measured as overseas turnover) throughout the sample period, and 0 
otherwise. 
EXCHANGE: effective exchange rate calculated as the geometric weighted average of 
bilateral exchange rates adjusted by relative consumer prices. 
DEFLATORS: all variables are deflated using the industry-specific price of output 
 
Correlation matrix 
Table A2 shows the correlation matrix among all variables used in the paper. As can be 
observed, the correlation coefficients between regressors are not large enough to indicate 
any collinearity problem. 
 
3. Is our data sample representative? Comparing the average failure rate and the 
average growth of profitability in our sample with those of the UK manufacturing 
sector, as reported in the ONS database 
It is noteworthy that the availability of financial information in FAME varies considerably 
across firms. As Eberhardt and Helmers (2010) and Helmers et al. (2011) point out, larger 
firms provide a much broader range of financial information compared to smaller companies 
for which only an abridged balance sheet is required. On the other hand, Faggio et al. (2007) 
and Draca et al. (2011) argue that unlisted firms in the UK are required to report 
significantly more accounting information compared to their US counterparts. In any event, 
to ensure that our sample is representative, we contrast it to aggregate data for the UK 
manufacturing sector. In Figures A1 and A2, we compare the average failure rate and the 
Page 35 of 64 Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
5 
 
average growth of profitability in our sample with those of the UK manufacturing sector, as 
reported in the ONS database. The series are highly correlated and exhibit similar business 
cycle dynamics, which suggests that our sample is reasonably representative of the broader 
aggregate. 
 
4. Do our sample selection criteria generate a bias in our sample? 
In order to answer this question, we provide two sets of comparisons. First, we compare the 
failure rate, debt ratio, and solvency ratio for our full sample and for those firms that were 
dropped in estimation. Second, we compare failure rates in the sample we used in estimation 
with those of the entire FAME dataset for various categories of firms.  
  
Comparing the failure rate, debt ratio, and solvency ratio for our full sample and for those 
firms that were dropped in estimation. 
Figures A3 to A5 compare the evolution over time of the failure rate (Figure A3), the debt 
ratio (Figure A4), and the solvency ratio (Figure A5) for our full sample and for those firms 
which were dropped in estimation. We do not observe significant differences between the 
two groups of firms. 
 
Comparing failure rates in the sample we used in estimation with those of the entire FAME 
dataset for various categories of firms 
Figures A6 to A11 compare the evolution over time of the failure rates in the sample we 
used in estimation with those in the entire FAME dataset for the full sample (Figure A6), 
young and old firms (Figure A7), small and large firms (Figure A8), firms belonging to 
industrial groups 1 to 3 (Figure A9), firms belonging to industrial groups 4 to 6 (Figure 
A10), and firms belonging to industrial groups 7 to 9 (Figure A11)
3
. We observe that for 
most of the groups of firms considered, the failure rates in the sample we used in estimation 
and the entire FAME database are similar.  
Both sets of comparisons show that our sample selection criteria do not create bias in 
our sample. 
 
                                                            
3
 Industrial groups are defined using Blundell et al.’s (1992) classification, namely metals and metal goods 
(Group 1); other minerals, and mineral products (Group 2); chemicals and man-made fibres (Group 3); 
mechanical engineering (Group 4); electrical and instrument engineering (Group 5); motor vehicles and parts, 
other transport equipment (Group 6); food, drink, and tobacco (Group 7); textiles, clothing, leather, and 
footwear (Group 8); and others (Group 9).  
 
Page 36 of 64Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
6 
 
5. Additional summary statistics 
 
Summary statistics for firms in different industrial groups 
Table A3 presents descriptive statistics for our main variables for firms belonging to the 
different industrial groups listed in footnote 3. 
 
Summary statistics for different groups of firms based on the degree of asymmetric 
information that they face. 
Table A4 presents summary statistics differentiating firms into bank-dependent and non 
bank-dependent; young and old; and exporters and non-exporters. These statistics suggest 
that more bank-dependent firms have a higher failure rate, as well as a significantly higher 
interest burden than their less bank-dependent counterparts. Young firms also display higher 
failure rates, as well as a higher interest burden than their older counterparts. Finally, 
although non-exporters display higher failure rates than exporters, surprisingly, they show a 
slightly lower interest burden.  
 
6. Discussion of the coefficients of variables other than the interest burden in column 1 of 
Table 2 n the paper 
Focusing on the estimates reported in column 1 of Table 2 in the paper, we observe that 
firms with high levels of leverage face higher probabilities of failure compared to their low 
leverage counterparts, confirming previously reported empirical evidence (Zingales, 1998; 
Görg and Spaliara, 2014). This can be explained considering that high levels of debt 
increase moral hazard and asymmetric information problems, which can in turn lead to a 
higher probability of failure. The coefficients on solvency show that liquidity affects the 
likelihood of failure negatively. This is in line with our expectations and with evidence 
presented by other studies (Mateut et al., 2006). Furthermore, the coefficient on profitability 
is insignificant. Focusing on the remaining control variables, size exerts a negative and 
significant effect on the probability of failure, whereas age has an insignificant impact. In 
accordance with Bridges and Guariglia (2008), being part of a group improves the survival 
prospects of firms. Lastly, as in Baggs et al. (2009), a stronger local currency raises the 
probability of firm failure. 
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7. Ensuring that a higher interest burden and firm exit are not driven by the same 
unobservable variables  
It is possible that the Interest Burden (IB) is correlated with some omitted or unobserved 
variables that also affect the probability of firm exit. In this case, both the IB and the 
probability of exit may seem to occur at the same time, without a causal link running from 
the former to the latter. We have already controlled for a range of variables that typically 
affect corporate death rates (size, age, whether the firm is part of a group, the real effective 
exchange rate), as well as for a range of financial variables (solvency, leverage, and 
profitability). Nevertheless there may be other variables, such as for example, the education 
or experience of the CEO (which is time-invariant) or the firm’s innovation activities (which 
is time-varying), which may affect both the company’s survival chances and its IB.  
We deal with this potential omitted variable bias (OVB) problem in four ways. The first 
is by lagging the interest burden in our model. This enables us to deal with the time-variant 
omitted variables bias. It is unlikely that, for example, innovation activities this year affect 
the firm’s IB last year. The results for the baseline model, which are presented in Table A5, 
suggest that the lagged interest burden is still a significant determinant of firms’ survival 
chances.  
The second way we deal with the potential OVB problem is through our Instrumental 
Variable (IV) specifications. The IV technique allows us to estimate the coefficient 
associated with the interest burden consistently (free of bias caused by omitted variables) 
without having data on the omitted variables. Specifically, we instrument IB with the Bank 
of England base rate and the ten year government bond yield. These instruments are 
strongly correlated with IB (as shown by the tests for instrument validity discussed in point 
9 below), but unlikely to be correlated with both the time-variant and the time-invariant 
omitted variables, as well as with the firm’s survival chances. The results of the pooled 
linear IV and Probit IV estimations for the baseline model are reported respectively in 
column 1 of Table A8 and column 1 of Table A11
4
. The latter are discussed in detail in 
Section 9 below. 
The third way we deal with the OVB problem is by using a fixed-effects model. By 
estimating the model in differences from the mean, this method controls for any time-
invariant variable which may have been omitted from the model. In Table A6, we present 
estimates of our baseline Equation for two versions of this model: a fixed-effects linear 
                                                            
4
 In these specifications, leverage, solvency, and profit are also considered as endogenous and instrumented 
using their own lags. 
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model (column 1) and a conditional fixed-effects Logit model (Chamberlain, 1980, column 
2). It should be noted that given the nature of our dependent variable, a fixed-effects linear 
probability model is problematic as it fails to properly capture the curvature of the 
regression function in the proximity of 0 and 1. The conditional fixed-effects Logit model 
(Chamberlain, 1980) does not suffer from this problem, and, like the fixed-effects model, it 
allows the regressors and the firm-specific component of the error term to be correlated. 
Yet, a contribution to the likelihood only arises from those groups of firms that exhibit a 
change in status (here, from alive to dead), and the group of firms that exhibit no change in 
status are discarded. In particular, all the firms for whom the dependent variable is either 
always 0 or always 1 are dropped from the sample used in estimation. This explains the very 
low sample size in column 2 of Table A6. The adverse effect of the interest burden on firm 
survival remains highly significant and unchanged.  
It should be noted, however, that neither the fixed-effects linear model, nor the 
conditional fixed-effects Logit model control for time-varying omitted variables. For this 
reason, in Table A7, we report two sets of Instrumental Variable regressions which also 
control for fixed effects. Column 1 reports linear fixed effects estimates where all financial 
variables are treated as endogenous and instrumented. Column 2 reports a two stage least 
squares model estimated in first-differences where, as in column 1, all financial variables 
are treated as endogenous and instrumented. In both columns, the instrument set includes 
the base interest rate and the ten year government bond yield, as well as lags of solvency, 
profitability, and leverage. This approach allows us to take into account both time-invariant 
omitted variables (by first-differencing or by including fixed effects) and the time-varying 
omitted variables (by instrumenting IB and other financial variables). The results confirm 
once again that a higher Interest Burden still plays a positive and significant effect on firms’ 
exit chances.  
In summary, we can conclude that it is unlikely that both a higher interest burden and 
exit are driven by the same unobservable variables and therefore seem to occur at the same 
time, without a causal link running from the former to the latter. 
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8. Plotting Failure rates for firm-years that experienced a rise in the interest burden 
(H.IB) versus firm-years whose interest burden either stayed constant or declined 
(L.IB) 
Figure A12 plots failure rates over time of those firm-years that experienced a rise in the 
interest burden and those that did not. The Figure is discussed in Section V of the paper. 
 
9. Controlling for the possible endogeneity of IB and other financial variables 
While the results presented in Section V of the paper are robust to using alternative 
definitions of financing constraints, they may be affected by endogeneity bias. To address 
this problem, we employ an instrumental variables (IV) probit model. We assume that both 
the interest burden and the financial variables are potentially endogenous and instrument the 
former using the Bank of England base interest rate and the ten year government bond 
yield
5
, and the latter using their own lags. The results, which are reported in Tables A11 and 
A12, show that the effect of the interest burden on firm survival remains significant with a 
sizeable magnitude
6,7
. Moreover, changes in IB have a significant effect on firm survival 
chances only in the crisis period (Table A11). The results also suggest that the coefficients 
associated with the interest burden for both financially constrained and unconstrained firms 
are only statistically significant during the crisis (Table A12). Furthermore, during the crisis 
period, the sensitivity of firms’ survival chances to changes in IB is higher for constrained 
than unconstrained firms, with a difference which is significant in two out of four 
comparisons. In sum, we conclude that our findings are robust to controlling for the possible 
endogeneity of our regressors. 
 
Tests for instrument validity. Tables A8 and A10, which report the main regression results 
using a pooled IV estimator, also present p-values for the following tests of instrument 
validity: Sargan test; Anderson test; Wald test; and Kleibergen-Paap rk LM test. IV methods 
rely on two assumptions. The first is that the excluded instruments are distributed 
                                                            
5
 The base rate is the level of interest set by the Central Bank and is a measure of monetary policy stance. This 
variable is comparable to the Federal Funds rate which is typically used to measure monetary conditions in the 
US. The interest rate that the Bank sets affects the lending costs to financial institutions, which then affect a 
whole range of interest rates set by commercial banks and other financial institutions. This has a direct effect 
on borrowers, hence the effect on the IB. Government bond yields can go up if the Central Bank increases its 
target for the interest rate (in other words, if it tightens monetary policy). Consequently higher government 
bond yields influence the interest rates individuals and businesses pay to borrow money. 
6
 It should be noted that the number of observations reported in these Tables is lower than the corresponding 
number in Tables 2 and 3 in the paper due to the use of lagged variables as instruments. 
7
 Our main regression results were robust to using a pooled IV estimator, the results of which are reported in 
Tables A8 and A10. 
Page 40 of 64Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
10 
 
independently of the error process, and the second, that they are sufficiently correlated with 
the included endogenous regressors. The Sargan test is a test for overidentifying restrictions, 
which addresses the first assumption. More specifically, the joint null hypothesis which is 
tested is that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term, and that the excluded 
instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation. Under the null hypothesis, 
the test has a large sample chi-squared distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the 
number of overidentifying restrictions. A p-value higher than 0.05 suggests that the null 
cannot be rejected at the 5% level, whilst a p-value lower than 0.05 indicates that at least 
one instrument is invalid. It should be noted that the Sargan test is only valid if the relevant 
equation is overidentified, with more excluded instruments than included endogenous 
variables.  
To test the second assumption, we should consider the goodnesss-of-fit of the first 
stage regression relating each endogenous regressor to the entire set of instruments. A rule 
of thumb for instrument validity is that the F-statistic associated with the first stage 
regression be greater than 10. First stage regression results for the IV specifications reported 
in column 1 of Table A8 are presented in Table A9. The large F statistics suggest that our 
instruments have high explanatory power, and are therefore valid. 
Additional tests of the second hypothesis are the Anderson test of the null hypothesis 
that the minimum canonical correlation is zero. Failure to reject the null suggests that the 
equation is unidentified. The Kleibergen-Paap test is an underidentification test, which tests 
whether or not the instruments are adequate to identify the equation. In both cases, a 
significant result (i.e. a p-value smaller than 0.05) suggests that the model is identified, 
meaning that the relationship between the included endogenous regressors and the 
instruments is sufficiently strong to justify inference from the results. An insignificant test 
statistic (i.e. a p-value larger than 0.05) indicates that the model is underidentified or too 
weakly identified (due to the weak relationship between the endogenous regressors and the 
instruments) to justify inference from the model. We can see from Tables A8 and A10 that 
both tests suggest that our model is identified. 
A further condition for IV estimators to work is for the instrumented variables to be 
exogenous. In our Tables, we present a Wald test for exogeneity, whereby the null 
hypothesis is that all regressors are exogenous. Specifically, the Wald test for exogeneity 
tests whether the residuals from the first stage regression are correlated with those from the 
final model. The correlation of an exogenous model is zero. The test statistic has a χ2 
distribution. A p-value lower than 0.05 suggests that the null hypothesis needs to be 
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rejected, and that it therefore appropriate to use an IV estimator. The test statistics reported 
in Tables A8 and A10 suggest that the null that all regressors are exogenous can be 
rejected
8
.  
 
10. Regression results using an alternative measure of the Interest Burden 
Tables A13 and A14 report our main regression results based on an alternative measure of 
the interest burden: the ratio of interest payments to total debt (IB2). We continue to observe 
that the new interest burden exerts a stronger effect on corporate failures during the financial 
crisis period than in tranquil periods. The difference in the two coefficients is significant at 
the 10% level (Table A13). In addition, we find that constrained firms’ survival chances are 
more affected by changes in IB2 during the crisis compared to more tranquil periods, and 
that during the crisis, the sensitivity of survival chances to changes in IB2 is higher for 
constrained than unconstrained firms (Table A14). We conclude therefore that our main 
results are robust to using an alternative definition of the interest burden.  
 
11. Description of recent policies aimed at making low cost credit readily available to 
financially constrained firms in the UK 
Under Project Merlin, five major UK banks committed to lend £190 billion in 2011, £76 
billion of which were to be targeted at SMEs.  
The National Loan Guarantee Scheme, on the other hand, was aimed at enabling 
SMEs to access lower cost finance through Government guarantees of up to £20bn. Details 
on these policies can be found on the Department for Business Innovations and Skills 
website:  
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/32263/12-
539-sme-access-external-finance.pdf.  
The Funding Lending Scheme, which was introduced in 2012, and extended in 2013, 
was aimed at boosting loans to corporations by making both the amount and price of 
funding available to banks conditional on their lending performance. More details can be 
found at: 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/quarterlybulletin/qb120401.pdf.  
The Discount Window Facility incentivises bank lending by allowing participants to 
borrow highly liquid gilts from the Bank of England in return for less liquid collateral. 
                                                            
8
 As these tests are not available for IV Probit models, the tests reported in Tables A11 and A12 are those 
derived from the linear specifications. 
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Participants can then raise cash by lending the gilts in the market or by using them as 
collateral to obtain additional funding at a lower rate. More details can be found at: 
 http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Documents/money/publications/redbookdwf.pdf . 
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TABLE A1: Structure of the unbalanced panel 
Number of 
obs. per firm 
Number of firms Percent Cumulative 
1 138 0.68 0.68 
2 315 1.56 2.24 
3 506 2.50 4.74 
4 1,213 5.99 10.73 
5 8,522 42.11 52.84 
6 176 0.87 53.71 
7 337 1.67 55.38 
8 649 3.21 58.58 
9 1,455 7.19 65.77 
10 6,927 34.23 100.00 
Total 20,238 100.00  
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TABLE A2: Correlation matrix 
 
 
 IB Solvency Leverage Profit Size Age Group Exchange  
IB 1.000        
Solvency 
 
-0.323 1.000       
Leverage 0.200 -0.670 1.000      
Profit -0.532 0.208 -0.138 1.000     
Size 0.045 0.026 -0.118 -0.043 1.000    
Age -0.030 0.176 -0.165 -0.025 0.197 1.000   
Group 0.044 -0.015 -0.028 -0.001 0.369 0.123 1.000  
Exchange -0.032 -0.013 0.032 -0.013 -0.044 -0.032 -0.010 1.000 
 
Note: See Section 2 of this Appendix for definitions of all variables.
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Table A3: Summary statistics by industrial group 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The table presents sample means. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. Firms are allocated to one of the following nine industrial groups: (1) food, drink and tobacco; (2) 
textiles, clothing, leather and footwear; (3) chemicals and man-made fibres; (4) other minerals and mineral products; (5) metal and metal goods; (6) electrical and instrument engineering; (7) 
motor vehicles and parts, other transport equipment; (8) mechanical engineering; and (9) others. See Section 2 of this Appendix for definitions of all variables. 
 
 
 
 
 Industry 1 
 
(1) 
Industry  2 
 
(2) 
Industry 3 
 
(3) 
Industry 4 
 
(4) 
Industry 5 
 
(5) 
Industry 6 
 
(6) 
Industry 7 
 
(7) 
Industry 8 
 
(8) 
Industry 9 
 
(9) 
Fail 0.156 0.117 0.112 0.122 0.117 0.127 0.112 0.219 0.15 
 (0.36) (0.32) (0.32) (0.33) (0.32) (0.33) (0.32) (0.41) (0.35) 
IB 0.339 0.354 0.369 0.377 0.359 0.397 0.347 0.397 0.366 
 (0.37) (0.38) (0.38) (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.37) (0.40) (0.38) 
IB2 0.084 0.072 0. 078 0. 085 0.090 0. 075 0.069 0.093 0. 087 
 (0.24) (0.12) (0.17) (0.34) (0.25) (0.17) (0.09) (0.14) (0.14) 
Leverage 0.462 0.396 0.456 0.496 0.483 0.533 0.458 0.468 0.491 
 (0.28) (0.27) (0.31) (0.35) (0.35) (0.36) (0.33) (0.35) (0.41) 
Solvency 0.436 0.483 0.435 0.414 0.432 0.349 0.431 0.442 0.406 
 (0.39) (0.60) (0.46) (0.41) (0.42) (0.46) (0.38) (0.43) (0.75) 
Profit 0.088 0.092 0.080 0.087 0.092 0.064 0.077 0.073 0.089 
 (0.17) (0.28) (0.18) (0.18) (0.22) (0.18) (0.14) (0.16) (0.21) 
Size 3.714 4.159 4.256 3.911 3.888 4.271 4.198 3.682 3.773 
 (1.13) (1.39) (1.39) (1.32) (1.32) (1.45) (1.38) (1.09) (1.29) 
Age 28.279 29.13 26.342 26.278 23.151 21.24 26.568 31.38 25.963 
 (22.20) (23.75) (22.57) (22.52) (18.29) (19.78) (24.46) (26.40) (22.46) 
Group 0.161 0.219 0.230 0.228 0.189 0.209 0.215 0.157 0.180 
 (0.36) (0.41) (0.42) (0.42) (0.39) (0.41) (0.41) (0.36) (0.38) 
Exchange 96.907 96.776 96.68 96.734 96.763 96.78 96.461 97.933 97.143 
 (11.49) (11.54) (11.54) (11.52) (11.55) (11.52) (11.54) (11.37) (11.50) 
Observations 24,233 4,057 17,690 10,735 18,184 5,454 12,150 7,515 37,477 
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TABLE A4: Summary statistics taking firm heterogeneity into account 
 BankDep1=1 
 
(1) 
Bankep1=0 
 
(2) 
 
Diff. 
 
(3) 
BankDep2=1 
 
(4) 
Bankep2=0 
 
(5) 
 
Diff. 
 
(6) 
Young=1 
 
(7) 
Young=0 
 
(8) 
Diff. 
 
(9) 
Non- 
Exporter=1 
(10) 
Non-
Exporter=0 
(11) 
 
Diff. 
 
(12) 
Fail 0.043 0.041 0.286 0.049 0.040 0.000 0.158 0.123 0.000 0.167 0.068 0.000 
 (0.19) (0.20)  (0.21) (0.19)  (0.36) (0.33)  (0.37) (0.25)  
IB 0.420 0.291 0.000 0.437 0.282 0.000 0.390 0.341 0.000 0.346 0.387 0.000 
 (0.40) (0.35)  (0.40) (0.35)  (0.39) (0.38)  (0.38) (0.39)  
Leverage 0.591 0.457 0.000 0.581 0.446 0.000 0.527 0.429 0.000 0.461 0.512 0.000 
 (0.37) (0.22)  (0.43) (0.23)  (0.37) (0.32)  (0.35) (0.34)  
Solvency 0.284 0.405 0.000 0.296 0.421 0.000 0.349 0.488 0.000 0.446 0.362 0.000 
 (0.42) (0.31)  (0.49) (0.32)  (0.51) (0.55)  (0.57) (0.43)  
Profit 0.065 0.091 0.000 0.060 0.097 0.000 0.088 0.083 0.000 0.089 0.078 0.000 
 (0.17) (0.15)  (0.18) (0.16)  (0.22) (0.16)  (0.19) (0.17)  
Size 4.234 3.853 0.000 4.302 3.836 0.000 3.761 4.056 0.000 3.741 4.374 0.000 
 (1.34) (1.16)  (1.41) (1.19)  (1.34) (1.27)  (1.29) (1.25)  
Age 26.992 26.476 0.001 26.985 26.463 0.000 9.966 41.953 0.000 25.172 29.833 0.000 
 (22.73) (21.45)  (23.05) (21.48)  (5.84) (21.17)  (22.07) (22.97)  
Group 0.245 0.177 0.000 0.281 0.178 0.000 0.168 0.215 0.000 0.168 0.264 0.000 
 (0.43) (0.38)  (0.45) (0.38)  (0.37) (0.41)  (0.37) (0.44)  
Exchange 98.528 98.532 0.958 98.368 98.369 0.985 96.984 96.913 0.249 96.694 97.732 0.000 
 (11.03) (11.03)  (11.02) (11.02)  (11.46) (11.56)  (11.66) (10.99)  
Observations 38,142 38,095  42,276 42,235  66,983 69,999  103,481 33,501  
Notes: The table presents sample means. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. BankDep1 (BankDep2) is equal to 1 for firm i in year t if this firm’s mix1 (mix2) is in the top 50% of 
the distribution of the mix1s (mix2s) of all firms operating in the same industry as firm i in year t, and 0 otherwise. Mix1 is the ratio of short-term debt to the sum of short-term debt and trade 
credit. Mix2 is the ratio of short-term debt to total current liabilities. Young is equal to 1 in a given year for firms in the bottom 50% of the age distribution of all firms operating in the same 
industry as firm i in that year, and 0 otherwise. Non-exporter is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has never reported a positive amount of exports throughout the sample period, and 0 
otherwise. Diff. is the p-value of the test statistic for the equality of means. See Section 2 of this Appendix for definitions of all variables. 
Page 47 of 64 Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
17 
 
Table A5: Firm survival and the financial crisis: including IB lagged 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: A proportional hazard model was used in estimation. The dependent variable is a dummy equal 
to 1 if the firm fails, and 0 otherwise. Robust z-statistics are presented in parentheses. Standard errors 
are clustered at the firm level. Time and industry dummies were included in all models. See Section 2 
of this Appendix for definitions of all variables. *: significant at 10%; **: significant at 5%; ***: 
significant at 1%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fail Baseline 
 (1) 
IBt-1 0.536*** 
 (7.07) 
Solvencyt -0.293* 
 (-1.84) 
Leveraget 0.498*** 
 (3.25) 
Profitt -0.563*** 
 (-2.88) 
Sizet -0.405*** 
 (-14.35) 
Aget 0.000 
 (0.26) 
Groupt -0.487*** 
 (-5.42) 
Exchanget 0.193*** 
 (4.85) 
Observations 41,690 
Log-Likelihood -5044 
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TABLE A6: Fixed-effects models 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Fixed-effects (FE) and conditional fixed-effects logit estimates are reported. The dependent 
variable is a dummy equal to 1 in a given year if the firm is recorded as failed in that year, and 0 
otherwise. Robust z-statistics are presented in parentheses.  Time dummies were included in all models. 
See Section 2 of this Appendix for definitions of all variables. *: significant at 10%; **: significant at 
5%; ***: significant at 1%. 
 
 
 
  
Fail FE Logit-FE 
 (1) (3) 
IB 0.003** 0.543** 
 (2.04) (2.33) 
Solvency -0.012*** -0.220 
 (-2.91) (-0.30) 
Leverage -0.006 -0.694 
 (-1.40) (-0.94) 
Profit 0.014*** -2.207*** 
 (3.61) (-3.20) 
Size -0.008*** -0.216 
 (-5.57) (-0.93) 
Age 0.005*** 0.001 
 (30.28) (0.70) 
Group -0.025*** -1.913*** 
 (-9.04) (-4.31) 
Exchange 0.004*** 0.367*** 
 (15.63) (12.29) 
   
Observations 58,995 1,690 
R-squared 0.837  
Log-likelihood  365.9 
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TABLE A7: Dealing with fixed-effects and controlling for endogeneity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 in a given year if the firm is recorded as failed in 
that year, and 0 otherwise. Column 1 reports fixed-effects estimates where all financial variables are 
treated as endogenous. Column 2 reports two stage least squares (2SLS) estimates of the model 
estimated in first-differences (FD). As in column 1, all financial variables are treated as endogenous. In 
both columns, IB is instrumented using the Bank of England base interest rate and the ten year 
government bond yield; and leverage, solvency and profit, using their own lags. Robust z-statistics are 
presented in parentheses.  The Sargan statistic is a test of the overidentifying restrictions, distributed as 
chi-square under the null of instrument validity. The Anderson canonical correlation statistic and the 
Cragg-Donaldson Wald statistic are distributed as chi-square under the null that the equation is 
unidentified. Time dummies were included in all models. See Section 2 of this Appendix for definitions 
of all variables. *: significant at 10%; **: significant at 5%; ***: significant at 1%. 
  
Fail Fixed-effects IV 2SLS FD 
 (1) (2) 
IB 0.019** 0.015** 
 (2.20) (2.88) 
Solvency -0.028 -0.155 
 (-1.47) (-1.63) 
Leverage 0.007 0.044 
 (0.35) (0.80) 
Profit 0.234** 0.306** 
 (2.19) (2.43) 
Size -0.007 -0.107** 
 (-1.33) (-2.37) 
Age 0.048 - 
 (0.64)  
Group -0.027*** -0.017** 
 (-6.53) (-2.44) 
Exchange 0.005 0.0005 
 (0.62) (1.17) 
   
Observations 23,798 15,365 
Sargan (p-value) 0.559 0.053 
Anderson (p-value) 0.000 0.000 
Cragg-Donald Wald 
test (p-value) 
0.000 0.000 
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TABLE A8: Pooled IV models for firm survival and the financial crisis 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 in a given year if the firm is recorded as failed in 
that year, and 0 otherwise. Robust z-statistics are presented in parentheses. IB is instrumented using the 
Bank of England base interest rate and the ten year government bond yield; and leverage, solvency and 
profit, using their own lags. The F-test of equality for IB refers to the test of equality between IB*Crisis 
and IB*(1-Crisis). Time and industry dummies were included in all models. The Sargan statistic is a 
test of the overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity. 
The Anderson canonical correlation statistic and the Kleibergen-Paap statistic are distributed as chi-
square under the null that the equation is unidentified. The Wald statistic is distributed as chi-square 
under the null of exogeneity. See Section 2 of this Appendix for definitions of all variables. *: 
significant at 10%; **: significant at 5%; ***: significant at 1%. 
 
 
 
 
 
Fail Baseline IB and Crisis IB*Crisis 
 (1) (2) (3) 
IB 0.035*** 0.035***  
 (3.22) (3.22)  
Crisis  -0.016 0.004 
  (-1.05) (0.51) 
IB*Crisis   0.076*** 
   (4.12) 
IB*(1-Crisis)   0.005 
   (0.49) 
Solvency 0.005 0.005 0.006 
 (0.51) (0.51) (0.63) 
Leverage 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.030*** 
 (3.43) (3.43) (3.17) 
Profit -0.055* -0.055* -0.057** 
 (-1.80) (-1.80) (-1.93) 
Size -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.010*** 
 (-8.66) (-8.66) (-8.48) 
Age 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.80) (0.80) (0.78) 
Group -0.006** -0.006** -0.006** 
 (-2.40) (-2.40) (-2.46) 
Exchange 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (5.52) (5.52) (6.35) 
F-test of equality 
(p-value) for 
   
IB   0.000 
Observations 26,500 26,500 26,500 
Sargan (p-value) 0.529 0.603 0.100 
Anderson (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Wald (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Kleibergen-Paap (p-
value) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
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TABLE A9: First stage results for the pooled IV regression reported in column 1 of 
Table A8 
 IB Solvency Leverage Profit 
Base rate 0.009*** -0.003*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Bond yield 0.017 0.012** 0.008 -0.004 
 (0.014) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Solvency(t-1) -0.305*** 0.083*** -0.044*** 0.0021*** 
 (0.012) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
Leverage(t-2) 0.029* -0.029*** 0.058*** -0.018*** 
 (0.017) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Profit(t-1) -0.079*** 0.058*** -0.044*** 0.371*** 
 (0.019) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Observations 26500 26500 26500 26500 
F-stat 648 8470 7298 415 
 
Notes: The Table presents the coefficients and standard errors. It should be noted that in the first-stage 
regression, all endogenous variables are regressed on the instruments and all control variables, time 
dummies, and industry dummies. We do not report the coefficients associated with the control variables 
and the dummies for brevity. See Section 2 of this Appendix for definitions of all variables. *: 
significant at 10%; **: significant at 5%; ***: significant at 1%. 
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TABLE A10: Pooled IV models for firm survival, financing constraints, and 
the crisis 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 in a given year if the firm is recorded as failed in that year, and 0 otherwise. 
Cons is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is financially constrained, and 0 otherwise. It is based, in turn, on BankDep(1/2), 
Young, and Non-exporter. BankDep1(2) is equal to 1 in a given year for firm i if its mix1(2) is in the top 50% of the distribution 
of the mix1(2)s of all firms operating in the same industry as firm i in that year, and 0 otherwise.  Mix1 is the ratio of short-term- 
debt to the sum of short- term debt and trade credit. Mix2 is the ratio of short-term debt to total current liabilities. Young is equal 
to 1 for firm i in year t  if this firm’s age falls in the lower 50% of the age distribution of all firms operating in the same industry 
as firm i in that year, and 0 otherwise. Non-exporter is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has never reported a positive 
amount of exports throughout the sample period, and 0 otherwise. IB is instrumented using the Bank of England base interest rate 
and the ten year government bond yield; and leverage, solvency and profit, using their own lags. Time and industry dummies 
were included in all models. With reference to the F-test of equality, IB*Cons refers to the test of equality between 
IB*Cons*Crisis and IB*Cons*(1-Crisis). IB*(1-Cons) refers to the test of equality between IB*(1-Cons)*Crisis and IB*(1-
Cons)*(1-Crisis). IB*Crisis refers to the test of equality between IB*Cons*Crisis and IB*(1-Cons)*Crisis. Finally, IB*(1-Crisis) 
refers to the test of equality between IB*Cons*(1-Crisis) and IB*(1-Cons)*(1-Crisis). The Sargan statistic is a test of the 
overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity. The Anderson canonical correlation 
statistic and the Kleibergen-Paap statistic are distributed as chi-square under the null that the equation is unidentified. The Wald 
statistic is distributed as chi-square under the null of exogeneity. See Section 2 of this Appendix for definitions of all variables. *: 
significant at 10%; **: significant at 5%; ***: significant at 1%. 
 
Fail Cons= 
f(BankDep1) 
Cons= 
f(BankDep2) 
Cons= 
f(Young) 
Cons= 
f (Non-Exporter) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
IB*Cons* Crisis 0.046*** 0.031** 0.058*** 0.046** 
 (2.85) (2.12) (2.95) (2.93) 
IB*Cons*(1-Crisis) -0.007 0.034** 0.021 -0.016 
 (-0.48) (2.02) (1.42) (-1.04) 
IB*(1-Cons)* Crisis 0.019* 0.048** 0.018 0.017 
 (1.76) (1.97) (1.42) (1.43) 
IB*(1-Cons)*(1-Crisis) -0.014 0.084*** -0.019 0.013 
 (-1.13) (2.60) (-1.58) (.67) 
Crisis -0.011 -0.012 -0.023 -0.018 
 (-0.95) (-1.10) (-0.95) (-1.21) 
Solvency -0.005 0.017 -0.006 -0.008 
 (0.52) (1.52) (-0.66) (0.81) 
Leverage 0.029*** 0.041*** 0.025** 0.023*** 
 (3.23) (3.65) (2.35) (2.65) 
Profit -0.065* -0.037 -0.071** -0.074** 
 (-1.86) (-1.02) (-2.03) (-2.14) 
Size -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.010*** -0.010*** 
 (-10.13) (-7.22) (-8.75) (-9.03) 
Age 0.001 0.001 0.0001* 0.0001 
 (1.04) (0.78) (1.92) (0.63) 
Group -0.006*** -0.006** -0.006** -0.006** 
 (-2.60) (-2.27) (-2.26) (-2.30) 
Exchange 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (2.29) (4.31) (5.70) (5.78) 
F-test of equality (p-value)     
IB*Cons 0.000 0.887 0.051 0.004 
IB*(1-Cons) 0.028 0.356 0.028 0.841 
IB*Crisis 
IB*(1-Crisis) 
0.037 
0.698 
0.535 
0.124 
0.026 
0.027 
0.083 
0.891 
Observations 24,027 24,528 26,500 26,500 
Sargan (p-value) 0.540 0.484 0.514 0.726 
Anderson (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Wald (p-value) 0.017 0.006 0.001 0.000 
Kleibergen-Paap (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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TABLE A11: Probit IV models for firm survival and the financial crisis  
 
Notes: Two-step IV probit estimates are reported. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 in a given year if 
the firm is recorded as failed in that year, and 0 otherwise. Time and industry dummies were included in all 
models. Robust z-statistics are presented in parentheses. IB is instrumented using the Bank of England base interest 
rate and the ten year government bond yield; and leverage, solvency and profit, using their own lags. The F-test of 
equality for IB refers to the test of equality between IB*Crisis and IB*(1-Crisis). The Sargan statistic is a test of 
the overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity. The Anderson 
canonical correlation statistic and the Kleibergen-Paap statistic are distributed as chi-square under the null that the 
equation is unidentified. The Wald statistic is distributed as chi-square under the null of exogeneity. See Section 2 
of this Appendix for definitions of all variables. *: significant at 10%; **: significant at 5%; ***: significant at 1%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fail Baseline IB and Crisis IB*Crisis 
 (1) (2) (3) 
IB 0.664*** 0.635**  
 (2.66) (2.54)  
Crisis  -0.083 0.346 
  (-1.19) (0.85) 
IB*Crisis   0.735** 
   (2.47) 
IB*(1-Crisis)   -0.140 
   (-1.29) 
Solvency 0.026 0.006 -0.102 
 (0.16) (0.03) (-0.66) 
Leverage 0.505*** 0.472** 0.499*** 
 (3.36) (2.46) (3.29) 
Profit -1.030** -1.139** -1.117** 
 (-2.14) (-2.41) (-2.34) 
Size -0.243*** -0.241*** -0.247*** 
 (-11.65) (-11.53) (-11.79) 
Age 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (1.23) (1.12) (1.31) 
Group -0.169*** -0.169*** -0.158*** 
 (-3.08) (-3.09) (-2.89) 
Exchange 0.043*** 0.042*** 0.044*** 
 (11.29) (10.38) (10.61) 
F-test of equality 
(p-value) for 
   
IB   0.005 
Observations 26,500 26,500 26,500 
Sargan (p-value) 0.529 0.603 0.100 
Anderson (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Wald (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Kleibergen-Paap (p-
value) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
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TABLE A12: Probit IV models for firm survival, financing constraints, and the crisis  
 
 
 
Notes: Two-step IV probit estimates are reported. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 in a given year if the firm is 
recorded as failed in that year, and 0 otherwise. Time and industry dummies were included in all models. Robust z-statistics are 
presented in parentheses. Cons is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is financially constrained, and 0 otherwise. It is based, 
in turn, on BankDep(1/2), Young, and Non-exporter. BankDep1(2) is equal to 1 in a given year for firm i if its mix1(2) is in the 
top 50% of the distribution of the mix1(2)s of all firms operating in the same industry as firm i in that year, and 0 otherwise.  
Mix1 is the ratio of short-term- debt to the sum of short- term debt and trade credit. Mix2 is the ratio of short-term debt to total 
current liabilities. Young is equal to 1 for firm i in year t  if this firm’s age falls in the lower 50% of the age distribution of all 
firms operating in the same industry as firm i in that year, and 0 otherwise. Non-exporter is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
firm has never reported a positive amount of exports throughout the sample period, and 0 otherwise. IB is instrumented using the 
Bank of England base interest rate and the ten year government bond yield; and leverage, solvency and profit, using their own 
lags. With reference to the F-test of equality, IB*Cons refers to the test of equality between IB*Cons*Crisis and IB*Cons*(1-
Crisis). IB*(1-Cons) refers to the test of equality between IB*(1-Cons)*Crisis and IB*(1-Cons)*(1-Crisis). IB*Crisis refers to the 
test of equality between IB*Cons*Crisis and IB*(1-Cons)*Crisis. Finally, IB*(1-Crisis) refers to the test of equality between 
IB*Cons*(1-Crisis) and IB*(1-Cons)*(1-Crisis). The Sargan statistic is a test of the overidentifying restrictions, distributed as 
chi-square under the null of instrument validity. The Anderson canonical correlation statistic and the Kleibergen-Paap statistic 
are distributed as chi-square under the null that the equation is unidentified.  The Wald statistic is distributed as chi-square under 
the null of exogeneity. See Section 2 of this Appendix for definitions of all variables. *: significant at 10%; **: significant at 5%; 
***: significant at 1%. 
Fail Cons= 
f(BankDep1) 
Cons= 
f(BankDep2) 
Cons= 
f(Young) 
Cons= 
f (Non-Exporter) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
IB*Cons* Crisis 1.513*** 1.298*** 0.934*** 0.993*** 
 (2.89) (2.74) (2.87) (2.90) 
IB*Cons*(1-Crisis) -0.115 0.104 0.035 -0.104 
 (-0.43) (0.41) (0.15) (-0.47) 
IB*(1-Cons)* Crisis 0.656** 0.619** 0.461** 0.763*** 
 (2.02) (2.12) (2.03) (2.73) 
IB*(1-Cons)*(1-Crisis) -0.215 0.318 -0.282 0.317 
 (-0.87) (0.76) (-1.39) (1.18) 
Crisis -0.274 -0.216 -0.338 -0.388 
 (-0.64) (-0.67) (-0.35) (-0.67) 
Solvency 0.116 0.178 -0.067 0.071 
 (0.55) (0.90) (-0.41) (0.39) 
Leverage 0.692*** 0.704*** 0.506*** 0.558*** 
 (3.76) (4.00) (3.31) (3.52) 
Profit -0.917 -1.114* -1.241** -0.775 
 (-1.33) (-1.79) (-2.10) (-1.26) 
Size -0.243*** -0.236*** -0.249*** -0.255*** 
 (-10.57) (-10.28) (-11.85) (-11.97) 
Age 0.001 0.001 0.002* 0.001 
 (1.40) (1.29) (1.95) (1.23) 
Group -0.150*** -0.150*** -0.158*** -0.164*** 
 (-2.64) (-2.71) (-2.85) (-2.99) 
Exchange 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 
 (10.35) (10.31) (10.06) (10.18) 
F-test of equality (p-value)     
IB*Cons 0.000 0.028 0.005 0.000 
IB*(1-Cons) 0.000 0.563 0.000 0.147 
IB*Crisis 
IB*(1-Crisis) 
0.004 
0.604 
0.019 
0.527 
0.247 
0.097 
0.186 
0.028 
Observations 24,027 24,528 26,500 26,500 
Sargan (p-value) 0.540 0.484 0.514 0.726 
Anderson (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Wald (p-value) 0.017 0.006 0.001 0.000 
Kleibergen-Paap (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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TABLE A13: Firm survival and the crisis: Alternative interest burden  
  
Notes: All estimates were obtained using a proportional hazard model. The dependent variable is a 
dummy equal to 1 in a given year if the firm is recorded as failed in that year, and 0 otherwise. IB2 is 
the ratio of interest payments to total debt. Robust z-statistics are presented in parentheses. The F-test 
of equality for IB2 refers to the test of equality between IB2*Crisis and IB2*(1-Crisis). Time and 
industry dummies were included in all models. See Section 2 of this Appendix for definitions of all 
variables. *: significant at 10%; **: significant at 5%; ***: significant at 1%. 
 
 
  
Fail Baseline IB2 and Crisis IB2*Crisis 
 (1) (2) (3) 
IB2 0.253*** 0.253***  
 (4.95) (4.95)  
Crisis  1.012* 1.046* 
  (1.73) (1.77) 
IB2*Crisis   0.360*** 
   (5.21) 
IB2*(1-Crisis)   0.207*** 
   (3.63) 
Solvency -0.420*** -0.420*** -0.435*** 
 (-3.05) (-3.05) (-3.17) 
Leverage 1.065*** 1.065*** 1.048*** 
 (7.58) (7.58) (7.49) 
Profit -1.017*** -1.017*** -1.019*** 
 (-5.87) (-5.87) (-5.88) 
Size -0.331*** -0.331*** -0.330*** 
 (-13.46) (-13.46) (-13.43) 
Age 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.76) (0.76) (0.72) 
Group -0.499*** -0.499*** -0.501*** 
 (-6.24) (-6.24) (-6.25) 
Exchange 0.167*** 0.167*** 0.171*** 
 (4.41) (4.41) (4.43) 
Constant -16.807*** -17.819*** -18.165*** 
 (-5.41) (-4.85) (-4.86) 
F-test of equality  
(p-value) for 
   
IB2   0.087 
Observations 36,330 36,330 36,330 
Log-Likelihood -5,886 -5,886 -5,885 
Page 56 of 64Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
26 
 
TABLE A14: Firm survival, financing constraints, and the crisis: Alternative interest 
burden 
 
 
Notes: All estimates were obtained using a proportional hazard model. The dependent variable is a dummy equal 
to 1 in a given year if the firm is recorded as failed in that year, and 0 otherwise. IB2 is the ratio of interest 
payments to total debt. Robust z-statistics are presented in parentheses. Cons is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
firm is financially constrained, and 0 otherwise. It is based, in turn, on BankDep(1/2), Young, and Non-exporter. 
BankDep1(2) is equal to 1 in a given year for firm i if its mix1(2) is in the top 50% of the distribution of the 
mix1(2)s of all firms operating in the same industry as firm i in that year, and 0 otherwise. Mix1 is the ratio of 
short-term- debt to the sum of short- term debt and trade credit. Mix2 is the ratio of short-term debt to total current 
liabilities. Young is equal to 1 for firm i in year t  if this firm’s age falls in the lower 50% of the age distribution of 
all firms operating in the same industry as firm i in that year, and 0 otherwise. Non-exporter is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the firm has never reported a positive amount of exports throughout the sample period, and 0 
otherwise. Time and industry dummies were included in all models. With reference to the F-test of equality, 
IB2*Cons refers to the test of equality between IB2*Cons*Crisis and IB2*Cons*(1-Crisis). IB2*(1-Cons) refers to 
the test of equality between IB2*(1-Cons)*Crisis and IB2*(1-Cons)*(1-Crisis). IB2*Crisis refers to the test of 
equality between IB2*Cons*Crisis and IB2*(1-Cons)*Crisis. Finally, IB2*(1-Crisis) refers to the test of equality 
between IB2*Cons*(1-Crisis) and IB2*(1-Cons)*(1-Crisis). See Section 2 of this Appendix for definitions of all 
variables. *: significant at 10%; **: significant at 5%; ***: significant at 1%. 
Fail             Cons= 
f(BankDep1) 
Cons= 
f(BankDep2) 
Cons= 
f(Young) 
Cons= 
f(Non-
Exporter) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
IB2*Cons* Crisis 2.382*** 6.721*** 0.704*** 0.945*** 
 (5.34) (9.46) (5.06) (5.78) 
IB2*Cons*(1-Crisis) 1.391** 3.171*** 0.215*** 0.120 
 (2.41) (5.84) (3.32) (1.57) 
IB2*(1-Cons)* Crisis 0.351*** 0.373*** 0.305*** 0.315*** 
 (4.89) (5.26) (4.01) (4.11) 
IB2*(1-Cons)*(1-Crisis) 0.210*** 0.210*** 0.164 0.392*** 
 (3.66) (3.65) (1.31) (3.87) 
Crisis 1.069* 1.056* 0.965 1.006* 
 (1.73) (1.71) (1.64) (1.72) 
Solvency -0.410*** -0.372*** -0.441*** -0.458*** 
 (-2.92) (-2.70) (-3.20) (-3.35) 
Leverage 1.084*** 1.067*** 1.046*** 1.034*** 
 (7.58) (7.54) (7.44) (7.40) 
Profit -1.069*** -1.032*** -1.012*** -1.010*** 
 (-6.17) (-6.04) (-5.84) (-5.83) 
Size -0.335*** -0.338*** -0.330*** -0.330*** 
 (-13.54) (-13.76) (-13.41) (-13.40) 
Age 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.86) (0.49) (0.92) (0.73) 
Group -0.510*** -0.510*** -0.503*** -0.505*** 
 (-6.24) (-6.34) (-6.27) (-6.30) 
Exchange 0.177*** 0.181*** 0.168*** 0.172*** 
 (4.38) (4.38) (4.39) (4.50) 
Constant -18.735*** -19.136*** -17.822*** -18.188*** 
 (-4.80) (-4.80) (-4.83) (-4.94) 
F-test of equality (p-value)     
IB2*Cons 0.172 0.000 0.001 0.000 
IB2*(1-Cons) 0.125 0.073 0.335 0.538 
IB2*Crisis 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.000 
IB2*(1-Crisis) 0.040 0.000 0.717 0.031 
Observations 35,428 36,330 36,330 36,330 
Log-Likelihood -5755 -5854 -5883 -5880 
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Figures comparing the average percentage change of profitability and the average 
failure rates in our sample and in the ONS database 
 
Figure A1: Comparing the average percentage change of profitability 
 
 
 
Figure A2: Comparing the average failure rates 
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Figures comparing the evolution over time of the failure rate, the debt ratio, and the 
solvency ratio for our full sample and those firms which were dropped in estimation 
 
Figure A3: Comparing the failure rate 
 
 
 
 
Figure A4: Comparing the debt ratio 
 
 
 
Figure A5: Comparing the solvency ratio 
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Figures providing a comparison of failure rates in our sample with those of the entire FAME 
dataset for various categories of firms 
 
Figure A6: Comparison for the full sample 
 
 
Figure A7: Comparison for young and old firms 
  
.1
2
.1
4
.1
6
.1
8
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Year
EntireFamefail oursamplefail
.1
2
.1
4
.1
6
.1
8
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Year
Entire Fameyoung Entire Fameold
oursampleyoung oursampleold
Page 60 of 64Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
30 
 
Figure A8: Comparison for small and large firms 
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Figure A9: Comparison for firms belonging to different industrial groups (1) 
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Figure A10: Comparison for firms belonging to different industrial groups (2) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A11: Comparison for firms belonging to different industrial groups (3) 
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Figure showing the failure rates for firm-years that experienced a rise in the interest burden (H.IB) 
versus firm-years whose interest burden either stayed constant or declined (L.IB) 
 
Figure A12: Comparing the failure rates of H.IB and L.IB firm-years 
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